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Ramdass v. Angelone
120 S. Ct. 2113 (2000)
L Facts
On January 30, 1993, Bobby Lee Ramdass ("Ramdass") was convicted
of the capital murder of Mohammed Kayani ("Kayani"). The jury recom-
mended a sentence of death based on the future dangerousness aggravating
factor. At the sentencing hearing held by the judge approximately two
months after the jury's verdict, Ramdass argued that the jury should have
been instructed that he would be ineligible for parole if given a life sentence.
Ramdass argued that at the time of the jury's verdict and sentence recom-
mendation he had previously been convicted of crimes which rendered him
ineligible for parole under Virginia's "three strikes" law.' Although
Ramdass was convicted of a crime which counted as a "strike," final judg-
ment was not entered until after the jury's verdict and recommendation of
the death sentence. Final judgment was entered on that non-capital crime
on February 18, 1993, between the date of the jury's verdict on the Kayani
murder and the date of the sentencing hearing at which the judge imposed
the death sentence.' The Supreme Court of Virginia denied Ramdass's
appeal
Ramdass then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari. Before granting the writ, the United States Supreme Court
decided Simmons v. South Carolina,4 holding that the jury in a capital case,
upon the defendant's request, must be informed of a defendant's parole
ineligibility when the de endant's future dangerousness is at issue.5 The
Court granted Ramdass's writ and remanded his case to the Supreme Court
of Virginia for reconsideration in light of the standards set forth in
Simmons.6 The Supreme Court of Virginia found that Ramdass's conviction
for the murder of Kayani was not his third "strike" because final judgment
1. Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 2118 (2000). Virginia's "three strikes" law
states in pertinent part that "[a]ny person convicted of three separate felony offenses of (i)
murder, (ii) rape or (iii) robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon, or any
combination of the offenses specified in subdivisions (i), (ii) or (iii) when such offenses were
not part of a common act, transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole." VA. CODE
ANN. S 53.1-1S1(B)(1) (Michie 2000).
2. Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2117.
3. Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566, 574 (Va. 1993).
4. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
5. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994).
6. Ramdass v. Virginia, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994) (mem.).
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for the murder of Kayaiii was not his third "strike" because final judgment
had not been entered on a previous "strike" at the time of the jury's deliber-
ations in the Kayani murder trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia found
that Simmons was inapplicable to Ramdass's case because he was eligible for
parole at the time of his capital murder trial. Accordingly, the court af-
firmed his death sentence." Ramdass's subsequent petition for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied!
Ramdass petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the
Supreme Court of Virginia erred in not applying Simmons to his case. The
district court granted his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and denied
relief.9 The United States Supreme Court stayed Ramdass's execution and
granted certiorari.10 Ramdass argued that he was entitled to an instruction.
informing the jury that he was ineligible for parole under the "three strikes"
law."
I1 Holding
The United States Supreme Court rejected Ramdass's argument and
affirmed his sentence of death.
12
II. Analysis /Application in Virginia
The United States Supreme Court found that the ruling of the Supreme
Court of Virginia that Ramdass was not entitled to a "life means life"
instruction was "neither contrary to Simmons nor an unreasonable applica-
tion of its rationale."" The Simmons Court held that due process required
a "life means life" instruction only when the defendant was ineligible for
parole under state law. 4 The Court found that Ramdass's case was distin-
guishable from Simmons because Ramdass was not in fact ineligible for
parole at the time of the jury's deliberation and verdict.1" Ramdass argued
7. Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 360, 361 (Va. 1994).
8. Ramdass v. Virginia, 514 U.S. 1085 (1995).(mem.).
9. Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 1999).
10. Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 523 (1999) (mem.); Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S.
Ct. 784 (2000) (mem.).
11. Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2119 (2000).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2120.
14. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994).
15. Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2120. Ramdass was technically eligible forparole at the time
the jury returned its verdict and sentence recommendation because the trial court had not yet
entered final judgment on one of the convictions that would have made him ineligible for
parole under Virginia's three strikes law. Id.
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that Simmons was technically not parole-ineligible under South Carolina
law, and that Ramdass's situation under Virginia law was substantially
similar to that of Simmons so as to warrant application of the Simmons rule
to his case.' 6 The Court found that Ramdass's contentions that Simmons
was not in fact ineligible for parole at the time of his sentencing because the
South Carolina Board of Probation had not formally determined that he
was ineligible for parole and that "hypothetical future events (such as
escape, pardon, or a change in the law) might mean [Simmons] would, at
some point, be released from prison" were without merit. 7 The Court
stated that Ramdass's contentions were irrelevant because he "was not
ineligible for parole as a matter of state law at the time of his sentencing
trial.""8 Ramdass was technically eligible for parole under Virginia law at
the time of the jury's sentence recommendation because, although he had
been found guilty of a crime that would have constituted his second strike,
the trial court had not yet entered an order of final judgment in that case.19
The United States Supreme Court found that the Supreme Court of
Virginia was not required to extend the holding of Simmons to include
Ramdass's situation. The Court disagreed with Ramdass's contention that
the state court should be required to "evaluate whether it looks like the
defendant will turn out to be parole ineligible."21 The Court noted that
Ramdass's proposed extension of the Simmons rule would have the effect of
requiring a jury to consider peripheral possibilities such as whether the
conviction will be overturned on appeal, or whether a defendant would be
pardoned at some point in the future, in determining a defendant's parole
eligibility.' The Court stated that requiring such an evaluation might
distract the jury from considering the central issues in a capital sentencing,
which are the presence or absence of aggravating factors and the balancing
of aggravating evidence with mitigating evidence.23 The Court also noted
that "the admissibility of evidence at capital sentencing was, and remains,
an issue left to the States, subject of course to federal requirements." 4 It is
interesting to note that the four dissenting justices found that the Simmons
rule should have been applied in Ramdass's case and noted the "acute
16. Id. at 2120-21.
17. Id. at 2121.
18. Id. at 2120-21.
19. Id. at 2119. The Court noted that under Virginia hw, a conviction is not final until
the trial judge "enter[s] a final judgment of conviction and pronounce[s] sentence." Id. at
2117.




24. Id. at 2121-22.
2000]
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unfairness in permitting a State to rely on a recent conviction to establish
a defendant's future dangerousness while simultaneously permitting the
State to deny that there was such a conviction when the defendant attempts
to argue that he is parole ineligible and therefore not a future danger.""
The dissent also pointed out that "[t]he sole basis for the plurality's conclu-
sion that the [verdict on the "strike" in question] is uncertain is the possibil-
ity that it could be set aside under Rule 3A:15(b)," and that under Rule
3A:15(b) a guilty verdict can be set aside even after the trial judge signs an
order of conviction, rendering final judgments just as uncertain as jury
verdicts that have not yet been confirmed by a final order of conviction.
The holding of this case only applies to cases in which the murder was
committed before January 1, 1995, because Virginia has abolished parole for
defendants convicted of felony offenses committed on or after January 1,
1995.27 In Yarbrough v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia
expanded the application of the Simmons rule to cases in which the Com-
monwealth relies solely on the vileness aggravator.29 Yarbrough held that
a "life means life" instruction is required in all capital cases in which the
defendant is ineligible for parole.3" Section 19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code
now states that "[u]pon request of the defendant, a jury shall be instructed
that for all Class 1 felony offenses committed after January 1, 1995, a
defendant shall not be eligible for parole if sentenced to imprisonment for
life."31 Thus, in all Virginia capital murder trials for offenses committed
after January 1, 1995, fendants are eligible to have a "life means life"
instruction given to the jury at the close of the evidence presented in the
penalty phase.32
IV Epilogue
On October 10, 2000, Ramdass was executed by lethal injection.
Prior to Ramdass's execution, four jurors stated that they would have voted
to recommend a sentence of life in prison if they had known that Ramdass
25. Id. at 2128.
26. Id. at 2132; see VA. SUP. Cr. R. 3A:15(b).
27. See VA. CODE ANN. 5 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2000) (abolishing parole for defendants
convicted of felony offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995).
28. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
29. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 n.11 (Va. 1999). Yarbrough
emphasized that the defendant must request such an instruction. Id.
30. Id.
31. VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000).
32. For an example of a "life means life" instruction, see VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS CRIMINAL No. 33.126 (Lexis Law Publishing 1999).
33. Frank Green, Ramdass Executed in Killing 7-Eleven Clerk was 1992 Victim, RICH.
TIMEs-DISPATCH, Oct. 11, 2000, at BI.
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would never have been parole-eligible. 4 Two of the jurors asked Governor
Jim Gilmore to grant clemency to Ramdass, one stating that he "believe[d]
the outcome of the verdict would have been very different if [life without
parole] had indeed been an option.""
Melissa A. Ray
34. Frank Green, Juron Seek Execution Block, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 10, 2000,
"at B1.
35. Id.
2000]

